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Introduction
In order to have a successful radi oactive waste management
and d isposal program, the federal government must build
p ubli c confidence and trust in the siting process (1 ). To do
this three requirements must be met: 1) the program must be
techn ically feasible; 2) the program must be politically palatable; and 3) the program must be societally acceptable.
Citizen participation is necessaty to ensure that a radioactive waste management program is accepted by society and is
politically feasible. Citizen involvement indirectly impacts
technical feasibility by addressing the ethical and moral
implications of nuclear waste disposal, thus helping to establish the parameters of technical soluti ons.

Societal Acceptance of the Federal High-Level
Waste Program
When disposing of radioact ive waste, it is inherent that
value judgements will be made. This is most clearly illustrated
by the technical guidelines that are part of the waste management program. Words such as "safe" and "acceptable" and
"reasonably achievable" are relative terms. To whom is a risk
"acceptable" - the Department of Energy ( DOE ), the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the general public?
How safe is "safe" and who makes that value judgement'
A case in point is th e "Environmental Radiation Protection
Standards for Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear
Fue l, High Level, and Transuranic Wastes" developed by the
U.S . Environmental Protectio n Agency (EPA). These standards
set radiati on release limits th at the DOE must meet in designing a repository. The NRC is to ensure that the repository
design meets these standards w hen issuing a license to DOE
for construction of the repository.
The EPA standards allow for radiati on releases into the
environ ment at a level that would ca use 1,000 fatal cancers
over a 10,000 year period ; that is, o ne fatal cancer evety 10
years fro m the reposit01y. (The standard does not address
how many no n- fatal cancers would occur because of radiation
releases from the repository.)
Is this an acceptable level of risk? Clearly, it is to the EPA or
th ey would have set a different standard. Yet, citizen testimony
o n th e DOE's Draft Area Recommendation Report (DARR)
shows that this is clearly an unacceptable level of risk to the
public. One woman at the Warren, Minn. , hearing asked
whose child will die of leukemia because of this standard?
This is an e motional questi on. But emo tio ns are an appropriate response in addressing value judgement issues.
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The disposal of radioactive waste raises a number of ethical
and moral questi o ns which will have to be addressed before
society accepts a waste d isposal program. Two of these issues
are the intergenerational transfer of the risks inherent in
nuclear waste disposal, and the continued production of
nuclear wastes when we have no safe and proven technology
for isolating these wastes for tho usands of years.
In 1944, very little high-level nuclear waste needed disposal. By 1980, there were 10 million cubic feet of liquid high level waste from nuclear weapons production in temporary
storage and 122,000 cubic feet of irradiated (spent) reactor
fuel awaiting disposal (2). In the interim, society allegedly
benefited from the production of these wastes yet we are
passing on the risk of contamination of food and water resources to future generations. We are passing on the risks of cancer
and birth defects to 500 generatio ns over 10,000 years.
Is this morally responsible? Is it ethically acceptable'
Sho uld we, as a society, continue to produce these wastes
when we cannot guarantee future generations will not be
harmed by them? What are th e consequences of stopping or
phasing out the production of high-level waste? Which consequences are acceptabl e and wh ich are not? How do we balance present societal needs against the needs of future generatio ns? What are o ur land and water stewardship responsibil ities to future generations?
These are fundam e ntal questions which must be addressed
before a waste management program can be successful. The
questions raised deal with abstract concepts (such as land and
water stewardship) yet th e waste disposal program provides a
context for consideration of these concepts; it quite literally
brings the issues "down to earth ," since DOE wants to b ury
this waste in the ground. How these questions will ultimately
be answered depends on societal value judgements. And
th ese value judge ments are discussed and articulated by citizen involvement in the waste management program. If the
concerns raised by citizens at the DOE hearings are ignored by
the agency or by Congress, th e result will be the failure to site a
repository.

The Political Feasibility of Siting a High-Level
Waste Repository.
The siting of a high level nuclear waste facility is as much a
political decision as a technical one. The federal government
has an unbroken track record of40years of failure in atte mpting to successfully manage the nation 's high-level waste. Lack
of fe deral competence and poor responsiveness to the needs
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of states and citizens has lead to a distrust of the federal
government's ability to safely dispose of nuclear waste (3).
However nai ve ly, people in the 1950s and early 1960s
trusted the federal government to protect them from radioactive fall out from the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons
and fro m radiation releases from nuclear reacto rs. That public
trust has been rep laced by a healthy skepticism of the federal
government's commitment to protect the public's health and
safety.
The DOE is charged with both the promotion of nucl ear
power and the disposal of nuclear wastes, thus creating a
conflict of responsibiliti es ( 1 ). Moreover, DOE, as the federal
agency responsibl e for nuclear weapons production and for
the storage of high level military waste , has a vested interest in
siting a nuclear waste facility based on political expediency
rather than sound technical criteria. Further, DOE has an
abysmal track record in handling the military waste under its
care in an enviro nmentally sound manner. At the Hanford
reservation in Washington state, more than 500,000 gall ons of
high -level liquid waste have leaked from underground tanks
over a period of years (2). The DOE waste storage program is
not licensed by the NRC nor subject to any public oversight.
DOE remains accountabl e to no one for its actions of
mismanagement.
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act, which established the current
waste management program and named DOE as the agency
responsible for siting and constructing two underground repositories, is a product of political compromises. The rigid
timetables for siting and construction of two repositories were
established to give assurances to th e commercial nuclear
power industry that the federal government was indeed
serious about "solving" the waste disposal problem. Many
people believe that the economic viability of the nuclear
power industry is linked to DOE's ability to state that it has
"solved" the waste disposal problem. The DOE has been
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criticized for foll owing the tim etable at the expense of technical excellence in the site selection p rocess.
Given the political nature of the radioactive waste management program, citizen participation in the DOE siting
process is essential to ensure that DO E does, in fact, isolate
this waste in an envi ronme ntally sound manner. Or if the
technology does not currently exist, to ensure that the waste is
stored temporarily in an envi ronmentally sound manner until
the techno logy for safe disposal is developed.
Finally, citizen participation in government decision making is a fundamental democratic principle. The political history of radi oactive waste management, and the complex value
judgements involved in establishing a waste disposal program
make the need for citizen participation all the more important.

Conclusion
Athough actively involving non-technical p eople in the
nuclear waste siting program may be cu mbersome and time consuming, it is necessary for the successful isolation of
nuclear waste. To ignore citi zen concerns and value judgements is to doom any radioactive waste management program
-no matter how technically sound - to failure.
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